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Abstract
We briefly report on a successful linear program reconstruction attack performed on a pro-
duction statistical queries system and using a real dataset. The attack was deployed in test
environment in the course of the Aircloak Challenge bug bounty program and is based on re-
construction algorithm of [DMT07]. We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the [DMT07]
algorithm and the related [DN03] algorithm with various dataset sizes, error rates, and numbers
of queries in a Gaussian noise setting.
Introduction
Responding to public and legislation pressures, companies are seeking practical and usable tech-
nological solutions to their data privacy problems. Larger corporations often employ Chief Pri-
vacy Officers and teams of privacy engineers to develop custom data privacy solutions. Some of
these companies, including Google, Apple, and Uber, are recently experimenting with provable
approaches to privacy using cryptography and differential privacy, which—at their current stage of
development—require significant research and engineering efforts.
But not all companies have the means and technological sophistication to adopt this sort of
bespoke approach to privacy. This void is being filled by a growing industry of companies selling
off-the-shelf data privacy solutions, many of which aim to anonymize or de-identify sensitive data.
These companies often advertise their anonymization products as not only preventing the disclosure
of sensitive data and but also ensuring compliance with relevant privacy laws, including HIPAA,
FERPA, and GDPR.1 Lack of transparency surrounds some of these technologies. Even when
disclosed, the technical underpinnings of many privacy protection claims are heuristic and hence
hard to evaluate.
Heuristic approaches to data privacy are not typically ruled out by data privacy regulations.
Furthermore, these regulations are not typically interpreted to require a strong level of protection
from data privacy technology. For example, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation limits its
scope to those “means reasonably likely to be used” to re-identify data [Eur16]. A report from the
UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office interprets similar language in earlier legislation as requiring
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protection against “motivated intruders”; alas, these intruders are assumed to lack both “any prior
knowledge” and “specialist expertise” [Off12]. This policy approach allows practitioners to argue
that data privacy technology can be deployed even when they can be theoretically demonstrated to
be vulnerable to attacks, as purely theoretical attacks plausibly fall outside the scope of the relevant
regulations
We believe that this is an unhealthy state of affairs. However, one can hope to affect the legal
interpretation of existing regulations by implementing theoretical attacks and demonstrating their
practicality. As a striking example, the decision to use differential privacy for the 2020 Decennial
Census in the US was largely motivated by the Census Bureau’s realization that traditional statisti-
cal disclosure limitation techniques may be vulnerable to practical reconstruction attacks [Abo18].
Reasoning about privacy. Academics have developed paradigms to reason formally about cer-
tain aspects of data privacy. Among these is differential privacy: a privacy notion that has at-
tracted significant attention since its introduction in 2006 by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith
[DMNS06]. A computation on a collection of data is differentially private if the outcome is essen-
tially statistically independent of any individual datum.
Work leading to differential privacy demonstrated fundamental tradeoffs between privacy and
utility when computing statistics on sensitive information. In 2003, Dinur and Nissim considered
executing noisy statistical queries on a database x of n entries [DN03]. They showed that if
the noise magnitude is o(
√
n), then there exists a simple linear program reconstructing all but a
small fraction of x, a result that was further generalized and strengthened in [DMT07, DY08].
These reconstruction attacks provided useful guidance in the theoretical development of a rigorous
approach to privacy, and in particular differential privacy.
Reconstruction in practice. In this work, we apply a linear reconstruction attack on a statis-
tical query system in the wild. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that such an
attack has been successfully applied to reconstruct data from a commercially-available statistical
database system specifically designed to protect the privacy of the underlying data.
The attack was performed on the production system called Diffix [FEO+18] using a real dataset
deployed in test environment in the course of a bug bounty program by Aircloak. The goal of
Diffix is to allow data analysts to perform an unlimited number of statistical queries on a sensitive
database while protecting the underlying data and while introducing only minimal error. It is
being advertised as an off-the-shelf, GDPR-compliant privacy solution, and the company reports
that “CNIL, the French national data protection authority, has already evaluated Diffix against
the GDPR anonymity criteria, and have stated that Aircloak delivers GDPR-level anonymity”
[AIR18b].
As we show, by answering unlimited, highly accurate statistical queries Diffix is vulnerable to
linear reconstruction attacks.
1 Diffix
Diffix is a system that sits between a data analyst and a dataset. The data analyst issues counting
queries using a restricted subset of SQL. For example,
SELECT count(*) FROM loans
WHERE status = ‘C’ AND client-id BETWEEN 2000 and 3000
2
Diffix executes a related query on the underlying dataset and computes the answer to the query
along with some additional random error. The noisy answer is returned to the analyst.
A primary focus of Diffix’s design is noise generation, which is a function of both the text of the
query and the subset of the data included in that query. The noise is sampled from a zero-mean
normal distribution and, depending on the data, rounded to the nearest integer. The standard
deviation of the noise depends on the complexity of the query; each additional condition in the
query introduces an additional layer noise of standard deviation 1.
In addition to adding Gaussian noise, Diffix employs a number of heuristic techniques to pro-
mote privacy. To protect against an attacker who may try to average noise out by issuing many
logically equivalent but syntactically distinct queries, Diffix restricts the use of certain SQL opera-
tors, especially math operators. Other techniques include suppressing small counts, modify extreme
values, and disallowing many SQL operators (including OR).
In order to accelerate development and testing of our linear reconstruction attack, we simulated
Diffix’s noise addition and small-count suppression in MATLAB. The results in Section 2 use real
query responses from Diffix, while those in Section 3 use the simulation.
The Challenge. From December 2017 to May 2018, Aircloak ran “the first bounty program for
anonymized data re-identification,” offering prizes of up to $5,000 for successful attacks [AIR18a].
The company granted researchers access to five datasets through Diffix, along with documentation
of the design and implementation of Diffix and complete versions of the datasets for analysis.
Researchers were allowed to use auxiliary information gleaned directly from the datasets in order
to carry out their attacks. We commend Aircloak for making Diffix available to privacy researchers
and for their support throughout this work.
Aircloak measured the success of an attack using an effectiveness parameter α and a confidence
improvement parameter κ. They have verified our attack to achieve the best possible parameters.
In a recent blog post, Aircloak reported that “Only two attack teams formulated successful attacks.
. . . Fixes for both attacks have been implemented” [AIR18c] At the time of writing, we have not
examined the new restrictions on the query language introduced to by Aircloak to counter these
attacks.
2 Implementing the Linear Reconstruction Attack
The attack targets a dataset x of size n database entries indexed by a set of unique identifiers I.
Each entry has an associated value of a Boolean target attribute, xi. Each query q ⊆ [n] specifies
a subset of entries, and the response aq = q(x) + eq is the sum of true value q(x) =
∑
i∈q xi and
an error term eq. The errors are sampled from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution of standard
deviation σ, then rounded to the nearest integer. Each query q is a uniformly random subset of
[n]. The set of all queries is denoted Q and is of size m.
We implemented a linear reconstruction attack following the approach of [DMT07] to find a
candidate database x′ minimizing the total error. [DMT07] was designed for a setting when some
errors may be very significant, but typical errors are small. In contrast, the linear program of
[DN03] is suitable when there is a bound on the maximum error magnitude. Although we use the
linear program of [DMT07], we deviate by using subset queries. That work analyzes a number
of other types of queries, including ±1 queries of the form q±(x) = ∑i∈q xi −∑i 6∈q xi for subsets
3
q ⊆ [n]. While these queries can be implemented using subset queries,2 the standard deviation
of the resulting noise would be larger. In contrast, subset queries were directly implementable in
Diffix with less noise and proved effective. Section 3 reports on additional experiments testing the
accuracy of these three contrasting approaches in the face of Gaussian noise.
We solve the following linear program over n+m variables x′ = (x′i)i∈I and (e
′
q)q∈Q:
variables: x′ = (x′i)i∈I and (e
′
q)q∈Q
minimize:
∑
q∈Q |e′q|
subject to:
∀q ∈ Q, e′q = aq − q(x′)
∀i ∈ I, 0 ≤ x′i ≤ 1
There is a standard linearizing of the above nonlinear objective function by introducing m additional
variables. To compute the final output, we round the real-valued x′i to the nearest value in {0, 1}.
The results described in this section are from a reanalysis of data gathered during the Aircloak
Challenge using the linear program described above. During the course of the actual challenge, we
used a slightly modified linear program as described in Appendix A.
Querying “random” subsets. The main hurdle in implementing the attack was specifying
queries for random subsets of the rows of the dataset. Diffix determines the error magnitude
per query depending on the description of the query. It increases the noise magnitude for each
additional condition in the query string. Random queries would require lengthy description and
Diffix would hence introduce large noise that would reduce the reconstruction accuracy. We needed
to find a way to specify a random—or “random” enough—subset of the data using as few conditions
as possible.
Our approach, ad hoc yet ultimately effective, was to use the unique user identifier i as the source
of “randomness.” For each ”random” query we used a predicate pq and let q = {i : pq(i) = 1}.
Concretely, each query was specified by a prime p, an offset j, an exponent e ∈ {0.5, 0.6, . . . , 1.9} \
{1}, and a modulus m ∈ {2, 5}. Row number i was included in the query q = (p, j, e,m) if the
jth digit in the decimal representation of (p · i)e was congruent to 0 mod m. For example, the
following query corresponds to p = 2, j = 2, e = 0.7 and m = 5.
SELECT count(clientId) FROM loans
WHERE floor(100 * ((clientId * 2)∧0.7) + 0.5)
hide= floor(100 * ((clientId * 2)∧0.7))
The exact form of the query depended on the various syntactic restrictions included in Diffix. By
modifying the ranges of p and j, we were able to tune the total number of queries. We restricted
p to the first 25 primes and j ∈ [5], resulting in a total of 3500 queries.
Results. Our target was the loans table in the banking dataset, consisting of real data of 827
loans from a bank in the Czech Republic. The rows are indexed by the clientId attribute, a unique
number between 2 and 13971. Each row has an associated loanStatus attribute, a letter from ‘A’
to ‘D’.
2q±(x) = q(x)− qc(x)
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Our goal was to determine which loans had loanStatus = ‘C’, given only knowledge of the
clientIds. In order to minimize the total number of queries, we restricted our attention to the subset
of clientIds in the range [2000, 3000], which contained 73 entries. Ultimately, our queries were of
the form:
SELECT count(clientId) FROM loans
WHERE floor(100 * ((clientId * 2)∧0.7) + 0.5)
hide= floor(100 * ((clientId * 2)∧0.7))
AND clientId BETWEEN 2000 and 3000
AND loanStatus = ‘C’
Diffix added error of standard deviation 4 to the output of these queries. We applied the same
attack on different ranges of clientIds with 110, 130, and 142 entries (and in the last case, targeting
the loanStatus value ’A’). In each case, we performed 3500 queries.
The linear program reconstructed the data for all four clientId ranges perfectly.
3 Simulated Experiments
In addition to the above results using the actual Diffix system, we performed additional experiments
using a simulation of a noisy statistical query mechanism. The simulated mechanism answers count-
ing queries with zero-mean, normally-distributed noise with standard deviation σ (and rounds to
the nearest integer). It also suppresses low counts in the same way as the Diffix system, though that
was only be relevant for the first experiment. All experiments described below were implemented
in MATLAB on a personal laptop, and all linear programs were solved in less than 4 seconds.
Removing auxiliary information. One drawback of our original attack on Diffix was the need
for complete knowledge of the clientIds as a prerequisite to performing the attack. Our first exper-
iment sought to infer these clientIds. First, we identified a range of 100 possible clientIds that had
a large number of present clientIds (relative to the other possible ranges). We want a large number
of present clientIds to minimize the effect of Diffix’s low-count suppression. We settled on the range
[2500, 2600] with 12 clientIds. While we identified this range using exact counts, we believe such a
range could be found by querying Diffix itself.3
We simulated responses to 3500 queries of the following form:
SELECT count(clientId) FROM loans
WHERE floor(100 * ((clientId * 2)∧0.7) + 0.5)
hide= floor(100 * ((clientId * 2)∧0.7))
AND clientId BETWEEN 2500 and 2600
The [DMT07] linear program was used to infer which clientIds are present in the range. There was
1 false negative among the 12 present clientIds and 0 false positives among the 88 absent clientIds.
3E.g., by issuing the query SELECT count(*) FROM loans WHERE clientid BETWEEN a and b to approximate the
number of present clientIds in the range {a, . . . , b}.
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How accuracy varies with size, queries, and error. The accuracy of the linear reconstruction
attack depends on the size of the dataset, the magnitude of the error, and the number of queries.
When implementing our attack on Diffix, we used many more queries than seemed necessary for
the level of noise used. The next experiment illustrates how the accuracy of [DMT07] varies with
each of these parameters against a system using Gaussian noise to answer counting queries.
The results are summarized in Figure 1. The plots display the average accuracy over 10 sim-
ulated runs of our [DMT07] reconstruction algorithm as the error magnitude, database size, and
number of queries were varied. Each run resampled the Gaussian noise while the underlying dataset
remained fixed. It is interesting to observe that the size of the dataset does not seem to significantly
affect the effectiveness of reconstruction.
As described in Section 2, the analysis in [DMT07] applies to ±1 queries but not to subset
queries. To compare the effectiveness of these two query types, we ran the same simulations using
±1 queries. The results are summarized in Figure 2. The plots are nearly indistinguishable from
the corresponding plots in Figure 1.
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(a) Noise standard deviation varied from 1 to 20,
in increments of 1, with 2550 queries. For n = 100,
the mean accuracy falls below 0.99 at σ = 5 and
below 0.95 at σ = 7.
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(b) The number of queries varied from 50 to 2950,
in increments of 100, with noise magnitude σ = 4.
For n = 100, the mean accuracy surpasses 0.95 at
1150 queries and surpasses 0.99 at 2050 queries.
Figure 1: Reconstruction accuracy as a function of the (1a) noise magnitude and (1b) number
of queries, for various database sizes. The data is averaged over 10 trials of the [DMT07] linear
program using subset queries.
Comparing [DN03] and [DMT07]. The original linear reconstruction attack for noisy counting
queries comes from [DN03]. In contrast to [DMT07], [DN03] makes the additional assumption that
each error eq is bounded by a maximum error E . In our experiments, we write E = Bσ, where B
is the error bound multiplier and σ is the standard deviation of the Gaussian errors. The [DN03]
linear program reflects the bounded-error assumption with an additional constraint and uses a
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below 0.95 at σ = 8.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 1000 2000 3000
Number of Queries
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Database Size, n
50 75 100 125 150
(b) The number of queries varied from 50 to 2950,
in increments of 100, with noise magnitude σ = 4.
For n = 100, the mean accuracy surpasses 0.95 at
1050 queries and surpasses 0.99 at 2050 queries.
Figure 2: Reconstruction accuracy as a function of the (2a) noise magnitude and (2b) number
of queries, for various database sizes. The data is averaged over 10 trials of the [DMT07] linear
program using ±1 queries.
trivial objective function.
variables: x′ = (x′i)i∈I and (e
′
q)q∈Q
minimize: 0
subject to:
∀q ∈ Q, e′q = aq − q(x′)
e′q ≤ Bσ
∀i ∈ I, 0 ≤ x′i ≤ 1
Our final experiment illustrates how the accuracy of the above [DN03]-based linear program
varies as a function of the error magnitude, number of queries, and the error bound multiplier.
The results are summarized in Figure 3. The plots display the average accuracy over 10 simulated
runs of our [DN03] reconstruction algorithm as the parameters were varied. Each run resampled
the Gaussian noise while the underlying dataset remained fixed.
Observe that as the error bound multiplier B increases, the accuracy of reconstruction degrades.
Because the linear program terminates once any feasible points is found, it is not surprising that
expanding the set of feasible points by increasing B.
Note however that the pattern extends to B = 3. One would expect a few queries (in expectation
about 4.6 queries per 2550 for σ = 4) to have rounded error greater than 3σ. Nevertheless, in each
of the 240 trials run with B = 3 and at least 2550 queries, a feasible solution was found. In contrast,
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for B = 2.5 and σ = 4 half of all executions with 1850 queries were infeasible (dropping to ≥ 90%
infeasible at 2250 or more queries).
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(a) Noise standard deviation varied from 1 to 20,
in increments of 1, with 2550 queries and dataset
size n = 100.
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and dataset size n = 100.
Figure 3: Accuracy as a function of the (3a) noise magnitude and (3b) number of queries, for
various values of the DiNi multiplier B. The data is averaged over 10 trials using a dataset of size
n = 100.
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A Additional Information on the Aircloak Challenge Attack
The results described in Section 2 are from a reanalysis of data gathered during the Aircloak Chal-
lenge. During the course of the Aircloak Challenge, we used a modified version of the [DMT07]
linear program. For transparency, this section describes the modified linear program and its effec-
tiveness.
The only difference between the linear program originally used and the one described in Section 2
is the addition of constraints upper bounding the magnitude of any error term.
variables: x′ = (x′i)i∈I and (e
′
q)q∈Q
minimize:
∑
q∈Q |e′q|
subject to:
∀q ∈ Q, e′q = aq − q(x′)
e′q ≤ 5σ
∀i ∈ I, 0 ≤ x′i ≤ 1
where σ = 4 is the standard deviation of the true error distribution. Note that if the true errors
were distributed according to N(0, σ) and rounded to the nearest integer, an error of magnitude
greater than 5σ would be expected once in every 1.7 million queries.
We first implemented the linear reconstruction solver using data from the clientId range [2000, 3000],
for which it achieved perfect reconstruction. Together with researchers at the Max Planck Institute
for Software Systems, we verified the attack on three additional ranges of clientIds containing 110,
130, and 142 clientIds. The results are summarized in Table 1. In two of the three ranges, the
attack again inferred whether each loanStatus was ‘C’ with high accuracy (1 and .9538). We were
surprised, therefore when the final validation (this time targeting loanStatus ‘A’ rather than ‘C’)
achieved accuracy of only 75.4%. Our confusion compounded when the accuracy degraded after
increasing the number of queries, suggesting that we were not accounting for some source of error.
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After further investigation, we realized that performing the queries for clientIds in [10000, 12000]
required more numerical precision than seemed to be supported by Diffix. The larger clientId values
in this range and the larger constants required for additional queries introduced errors that had
not affected our earlier tests. Ultimately, high accuracy was recovered by ignoring the results from
queries with larger values of e which seemed to require greater (but making no other changes to
the linear program solver).
clientIds Range Number of entries (n) Number of queries Target status Accuracy
2000-3000 73 3500 ‘C’ 1
3000-5000 110 3500 ‘C’ 1
5000-7000 130 3500 ‘C’ .9538
10000-12000 142 3500 ‘A’ .7535
10000-12000 142 2000, e ≤ 1.4 ‘A’ 1
10000-12000 142 1000, e ≤ 0.8 ‘A’ .9930
Table 1: Summary of reconstruction tests performed against Diffix using the modified [DMT07]
linear program. The queries in the final two resulted from restricting the exponent e to the indicated
range.
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